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Abstract
T he purpose of this paper is to  examine the effects of school quality  on 
perform ance in national exams and the  career decision at age 1G. We use 
micro d a ta  for the UK, which provides a rich set of variables on parental 
background, previous achievements, and com m unity variables. We find 
th a t, conditional on school type, the pupil-teacher ratio  hits no effect on 
exam ination performance. T he pupil-teacher ratio  luts an effect on the 
career decision a t age 16 as to  w hether to remain in full tim e education 
beyond the minimum age. enroll in training activities, or join the labour 
m arket full time. T h is finding appears to be very robust, and sustains 
when school type variables, exam results, and ability are controlled for. 
Keywords: School inputs, Educational A ttainm ent, Training. 
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1 In trod u ction
In rerent years, the effect of schooling input on educational achievement and 
earnings has been the subject of intensive research. Many studies seek to de­
termine the effects of school quality variables on later earnings. A few studies 
take a more direct approach and try to estimate the effect of school input on 
examination success. The measures for school quality typically used in this 
literature are pupil-teacher ratios, teachers’ salaries, or expenditures per pupil.
So far, the evidence on these effects is conflicting. The first systematic 
study has been performed for the US (Coleman et al. (1966)) and concluded 
that there are hardly any effects of school input. Some authors argue that most 
of the later research has confirmed that view, and that the benefits of increased 
spending on school resources are very limited (see. for example. Hanusliek 
(1996), Betts (1995), Hannshek. Rivkin and Taylor (1996)). In a recent survey, 
Hanusliek (1996) comes to the conclusion that three decades of research have 
shown that ’’srhool resource variations are not closely related to variations in 
student outcomes”.
Others argue that this evidence is far from conclusive. Positive effects of 
school quality are found, for instance, by Johnston and Stafford (197.3), Card 
and Krueger (1992), and Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996). Card and 
Krueger (1996) summarize evidence which is largely supportive of the view that, 
school quality is positively related to economic outcomes.



























































































the literature. They argue that two factors may he responsible for the positive 
effects of school quality on achievement: omitted variables, and aggregation. 
Omitting variables like family background, which have an independent effect 
on both the quality of schools attended, and later earnings, leads to a positive 
spurious correlation between school resources and performance. Furthermore, 
much of the work which is supportive for the view that school expenditures bear 
a positive effect on the student’s achievement use data on an aggregate level 
For instance, Card and Krueger (1992) use state average school characteristics. 
Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1990) show that the omitted variable bias can 
increase if the data is aggregated. Altonji and Dunn (1990), however, still 
find positive effects of school inputs on wages. They use disaggregated data 
and solve the problem of unobserved background variables by using variations 
among siblings in high schools to control for family background. Goldhaber 
and Brewer (1998) use data from the National Educational Longitudinal Study 
They find that some schooling resources do influence mathematics test scores. 
They further conclude that unobservable school quality factors are important, 
but not correlated with observable school quality variables.
We focus on the UK. While most studies in this field refer to the US, some 
studies for the UK have recently appeared. Harmon and Walker (1997) investi­
gate the impact of school quality on wages. Dearden. Ferri and Meghir (1998) 
analyze the impact of school quality on wages and education level attained at 
age 33. Feinstein and Symons (1997) and Robertson and Symons (199G) an­
alyze attainment measured by ability tests for primary and secondary school, 




























































































of school quality on examination performance and on the career decision taken 
at age 16. Our analysis of examination performance relates to the existing lit­
erature on school quality and school achievements. We are in a better position 
than most existing studies for the US due to the rich nature of our data set. 
which allows us to explicitly address the problem of omitted variables.
There are only few studies on the impact of school quality on the level of 
education achieved, although this clearly has important implications for educa­
tion and training policies. In a recent paper, Card and Krueger (1996) argue 
that an increase in school quality induces students to attend school longer as 
a response to economic incentives created by a higher payoff to schooling, or 
because school is simply more pleasant. In fact, aggregate data suggest that 
school quality bears an effect on the length of education (see Card and Krueger, 
1992). We think of ultimate educational attainment as the outcome of a step­
wise decision process, and we focus on one step in that process. In particular, 
we investigate the effect of school quality on the decision to stay in full time 
education beyond the minimum required age, go into some type of training, or 
join the labour market.
Our data are drawn from the National Child and Development Survey 
(NCDS). It refers to a cohort born in 1958 in Britain and Wales. All the indi­
viduals in our sample sit their first public examinations at age 16. After that, 
they have to decide whether to join the labour market full time, enroll in sortie 
training scheme, or continue full time education. The data is unique since it 




























































































mation. school characteristics, previous achievements of the individual, commu­
nity variables, and parental preferences about the child's education. Our main 
measure for school quality is the pupil teacher ratio on school level. Tiiis vari­
able is a most visible measure of school quality and has attracted considerable 
attention in the recent public discussion both in the IIS and the UK.
Our results are interesting in several respects. We find that family back­
ground. working environment, as well as parental preferences, play a significant 
role for the academic performance of the offspring. The pupil teacher ratio has 
a significant and negative effect on the child’s exam performance, conditional 
on parental background variables and indicators for previous achievements at 
age 7 and 11. Omission of previous achievement indicators leads to an infla­
tion of the coefficient of our school quality indicator by factor 2. The effect of 
the pupil teacher ratio becomes insignificant if we introduce school types as a 
further measure of school quality.
Again controlling for parental background variables and previous achieve­
ment, we find that the pupil teacher ratio is an important determinant for the 
career choice at age 16: pupils at schools with a lower pupil teacher ratio, are 
more likely to stay in full time education. When we introduce school type 
variables, the effect decreases in size, but remains significant. We check the ro­
bustness of our results for various model assumptions. We also estimate models 
conditioning on exam success, allowing for its endogeneity.
Our main conclusion is that school quality has a positive effect on the 




























































































overall educational outcomes. Our results add micro based evidence to the
findings of Card and Krueger (1992) that school quality has a positive effect on 
the length of education.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
data used for the estimation. In section 3. we present the econometric model 
Section 4 discusses the results, and section 5 concludes.
2 D a ta  and V ariables
Our data source is the National Child and Development Survey (NODS). The 
same data source is used for several other studies on the UK on similar topics, 
such as Harmon and Walker (1997), Feinstein and Symons (1997). Robertson 
and Symons (1996), and Dearden, Ferri and Megliir (1998). The NCDS followed 
a cohort of individuals born between 3rd and 9th March 1958 (see Micklewright 
(1986) for a detailed description of these data). Of particular interest is the 
data recorded in the third and fourth sweeps of the survey (Nt:i)S.3 and NODS-!) 
and information collected in the Public Examinations Survey (pks), a follow­
up survey to NCDS3. NOI)s3 was conducted in the spring of 1971. and records 
extensive information about the respondents, such as educational and physical 
development, aspirations for the future, spare time activities etc., as well as 
much of the information usually gathered in household surveys. Similar infor­
mation was also gathered for NCI)S4 in 1981 when cohort members were aged 
23. NCDS4 also contains further details on education and employment experi­



























































































and after the choices made at the age of 16.
We take as our measure of academic success the number of Ordinary level 
(O’ level) passes achieved by 1974.' Since NCDS3 dates from Spring 1971 
we observe the cohort members when they are still in compulsory full time 
secondary education and a few months before they sit their first set of public 
examinations, O’ levels and Certificates of Secondary’ Education (c s e ’s ). in June 
1971. The PES conducted in 1978 has detailed information on the examination 
results of about 95% of respondents to NCDS3, obtained from the schools.
For information on school leaving decisions, we draw on NCI>s4. This 
contains a month-by-month diary recording the economic activity from May 
1974 to January 1982. We use the information recorded in February 1975 to see 
whether the cohort members were at the end of their sixteenth year, full-time 
at school, had a regular job. or were following a training programme.* 2
The data set used for estimation is based on a sub-sample of almost 4.000 
cases out of the possible 11.602 who were traced at NCDS3. p e s  and nc:»s4.
'In 1974. two sets of public examinations existed in Britain - Ordinary level examinations 
and Certificates of Secondary Education (t'SKs). O' level candidates were graded on a scale 
of A - E. where C and above was considered a pass. For CSEs. results were graded from 1 to 
5 and a tirade One was considered to be an O level equivalent Therefore our number of (V 
levels includes ( St; Grade One passes.
2 We classify all those who have any element of training associated with their job as being 
in the "training" category, in addition to those enrolled on full time training schemes. Thus, 
for example, an individual in part time employment and on an apprentice* scheme would lx* 
classified as being in training, as would someone who was simultaneously on a government 




























































































Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std Dev
Dep. Yar.:
C16 Choice of activity at end of 10th year:
Stay at school 31.20
Enroll on training scheme 30.47
Regular Job 38.33
EXAM Number of O’ levels/CSE Grade Is passed 2.34 2 91
Explanat. Var.: 
oldsib Number of older siblings 0,128 0.012
yngsib Number of younger siblings 1.202 1.213
paageft* Age father left full-time education 1.012 1 733
maageft* Age mother left full-time education 1020 1.413
ptratio Pupil-teacher ratio 17.133 2.298
logine Logarithm of household income 3.800 1) 103
pawork Father working 0.903 0.291
mawork Mother working 0 091 0.402
paprof Father’s occupational class professional 0.057 0.231
modern Teenager attends a secondary modern school 0.210 0 131
tech Teenager attends a technical school 0.008 0.090
comp Teenager attends a comprehensive school 
(non-selective state run)
0.530 0.199
grammar Teenager attends a grammar school 
(higher ability state run)
0.149 0.350
indep Teenager attends a private school 0.014 0.200
special Teenager attends a special school 
(handicapped and special needs children)
0.020 0.140
singsex T<*enager attends a single sex school 0.200 0.112
intpar Teacher considers parents to be 
interested in teenager’s school work
0.745 0.135
paralev Parents want teenager to sit A levels 0.252 0.434
paruniv Parents want teenager to go to university 0.350 0.478
female Teenager is female 0.500 0.500
room With private room for studying 0.893 0.310
able7 Percent score on sum of age 7 maths and reading test 73.85 20.55
ablel 1 Percent score on sum of age 11 maths and reading test 57.01 19.51
ablelG Percent score on sum of age 1G maths and reading test 00.00 18.95
absl Absent from school for health reasons 1 week - 1 month 
(during year before examination)
0.351 0.177
abs2 Absent from school for health reasons 1 - 3 months 
(during year before examination)
0.000 0.2-18
abs3 Absent from school for health reasons > 3 months 
(during year before examination)
0.009 0.099
uneinp(la) Unemployment rate (Local Authority) 1.925 2.057
uman(la) Percentage unskilled manual workers (Local Authority) 7.328 2.755
*. These variables are measured on a scale from 1 to 10; 1 denotes that 




























































































Differences in the educational system in Scotland restricted our analysis to 
those teenagers living in England and Wales. A more significant factor was the 
problem of missing or incorrectly recorded information which contributed to the 
exclusion of some 7.000 observations from our data set. Information collected 
at the third sweep was retrieved from four separate sources (from the cohort 
member, from his or her parents, from the school that the 16 year olds attended 
and from the teenager’s doctor) and many respondents failed to complete one 
or more of the questionnaires. The studies referred to above which use the 
NCDS data, faced the same problems and are based upon similar numbers of 
observations. Table 1 explains the variables used in our analysis and provides 
means and standard deviations.
3 School Q u ality  and E d u cation a l A ch ievem en ts
Our dependent variables are exam results and the choice at age 16 between 
continuing full time schooling, training, or a regular job. In this section we 
discuss the factors that drive these outcomes and the corresponding variables 
(constructed from our data.
Educational outcomes of school children depend on a number of factors. 
The family background plays almost certainly a most important role, which 
affects pupil’s achievements in various ways. In the tradition of Becker (1981), 
one may want to distinguish between financial and time resources allocated to 
the child. Financial resources may be used to choose better schools for the 




























































































may consist of the time parents spend with the child for explaining homework 
exercises, for instance. However, not only is the amount of resources allocated 
to the child important for enhancing her performance, but also the efficiency 
of its use. For instance, better educated parents are likely to be more efficient 
when supporting the child with homework, and may provide more support for 
her academic development.
In the empirical analysis, we measure financial resources of the family 
by family income.3 As a measure of time inputs, we use the labour market 
status of the parents, particularly of the mother. As measures for the quality 
of time, we include parental education. Not only parental input affects the 
child’s performance, but also the studying conditions. We include a variable 
which measures whether the child has a separate room in which to study, lit 
families with more than one child, children are likely to compete for resources. 
Becker’s (1981) work suggests that parental attention is reduced as family size 
increases. Hanushek (1992) finds that the birth order plays an important role 
for children’s academic performance. We therefore include the number of older 
and younger siblings among our regressors.
When isolating the effects of school quality variables on academic achieve­
ment, not only do contemporary factors play a role, but also differences in 
previous academic preparations. Pupils with different previous achievements 
may, for instance, go to schools of different quality, and previous achievements
3The income information in Ncirsii is recorded in a Imnded form. We constructed a 





























































































should he included to isolate the effects of present school characteristics. We 
follow Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1996) and use standardized test scores 
to control for these differences. Test scores also reflect differences in ability 
between children. We use combined test scores from attainment tests in math­
ematics and reading comprehension that respondents sat at the age of 7 and 
11.
A further possible determinant for scholastic achievements is environmen­
tal factors, such as economic characteristics of the environment where the child 
grows up. For instance, attending a school in a working class environment could 
have some effect on the child’s behaviour, keeping family background constant. 
The attitude of the peer group of all class mates towards the importance of edu­
cation. may well have some influence on the pupil's behavior. Furthermore, it is 
possible that pupils’ incentive to work hard for their exams is affected bv future 
labour market prospects. We therefore include variables which measure the rate 
of unemployment, as well as the percentage of unskilled manual workers, on a 
local authority level.4
Parental interest in the child’s academic performance may not be entirely 
raptured by the above set of family background variables. Keeping wealth and 
education constant, parents may still differ substantially in their preferences 
regarding the education of their child. As has been emphasised by Hanushek, 
Rivkin and Taylor (1996), correlation between these preferences and school 
quality - which may depend upon the parents’ choice, may lead to an upward
4This information is drawn from the 1971 census. The local authority data covers around 




























































































bias of the effec t of school quality if the parents’ preferences are omitted. It is 
therefore desirable to include variables which capture the parents’ interest in 
the offspring’s educational career. We use a variable which reflects the opinion 
of the teacher on the parent’s interest in the teenager's school performance, and 
variables which indicate whether the parents want the teenager to complete 
Advanced levels (A’ levels) or to follow a University education.
Our quality measure is the pupil teacher ratio on school level. It is derived 
as the ratio of the total school roll and the number of full time equivalent 
tearhers. Aggregation to school level avoids the endogeneity problem of class 
level ratios, which arises if weak pupils are assigned to small classes (see Card 
and Krueger (1996)). The pupil teacher ratio is likely to be related to the type 
of school the child attends. In the empirical analysis, we estimate specifications 
which use this ratio as the only measure of quality, and specifications which 
also include dummy variables which specify the type of school that the 16 year 
old attended in 197d.5
The continuation decision after completion of the minimum required school 
education is a choice between full time education, activities with some elements 
of training attached, and joining the labour market full time. This decision 
should depend on similar factors as examination performance. Since it is taken 
after public examinations, a structural specification also conditions on the exam
5Diiring tlie early lll7(ls. the tripartite selection-based system of grammar schools, sec­
ondary modern schools and technical schools was still being list'd in many local authorities, 
while in other areas, mixtsl ability comprehensive schools were already introduced (see Har­




























































































outcome. School quality may affect career choice directly, and in an indirect 
way via exam results. The direct effect could he caused by better decision 
making support in schools which allocate more resources to their pupils, or by 
peer pressure. Furthermore, pupils may use the efficiency of past education as 
a benchmark when planning their future career. If pupil teacher ratios increase 
this efficiency, then pupils who attended schools with lower ratios may react to 
the increased payoff by choosing further full time education. Finally, as pointed 
out by Card and Krueger (1996), increased school quality may make schools 
more pleasant, and induce children to stay on beyond the minimum required 
age.
The set of factors which affect examination performance and career choices 
alike may be summarised in the following equation:
O, =  f (F, ,E, .T, ,S, .( ,)  (1)
where O, is the outcome variable, F, are family background variables. E, 
are environmental factors, T, are variables which capture the attainment history 
of the individual, and S, are variables which measure school quality.
The function /  and the assumptions on the distribution of the error teriii 
r, reflect the choice of the model. The simplest is to use a linear model. The 
number of O’ level passes obtained at age 16 ranges from 0 to 9 and is zero 
for about 50 percent of all individuals. This suggests the use of a Tobit model. 
Since the outcome is always one of the integer numbers 0,1,...,9, other options 




























































































Poisson or the negative binomial model.
The career choice after the exams will depend on the same types of factors 
as the exam results, and on the exam results themselves. The three alternatives, 
i.e. continuing full-time education (C l6 =  2), going into a training programme 
(C16 =  1), or entering the labour force (C16 =  0), can be viewed as ordered 
and modeled by an ordered probit model. Alternatively, a multinomial logit 
or multinomial probit model can be used, not exploiting the ordering. The 
multinomial models are more flexible since they include two linear combinations 
of the explanatory variables instead of one, but they impose an independence 
assumption among choices. We use here a generalized ordered probit model, 
where one of the category boundaries depends upon the regressors. See ap­
pendix for the complete model. This model has the same degree of flexibility 
and the same number of parameters as the multinomial logit model. It avoids 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption and instead uses the or­
dering of the alternatives. This seems to be more appropriate in the current 
context.6
f'Sif Pradhan and Van Soest (1995) for details and a comparison of the two types of models 




























































































4 R esu lts
Examination Equation
Table 2 presents tobit estimates, where the dependent variable is the number 
of O levels achieved.7 The first column is a basic specification, which includes 
various family background variables, and the pupil teacher ratio. Most variables 
are significant (at the two-sided 5% level) with the expected sign Both older 
and younger siblings affect exam success negatively, with older siblings being 
more important. This is in line with other studies which find birth order im­
portant for school success (Behrman and Taubman (1986), Hanushek (1992)). 
The effect of the mother working is negative, reflecting that a working mother 
spends less time to help the child. Children with their own room to study 
perform significantly better than others. The education levels of both parents 
are strongly positively related to exam success. In this specification, the pupil 
teacher ratio has a significant and sizable negative effect on the exam results: 
An increase in the pupil teacher ratio by one standard deviation decreases the 
number of O’ levels achieved by about 0.7.
In column 2. we have included standardised test score variables which 
measure past performance. Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1996) emphasise the 
need to control for past performance to isolate the effect of contemporaneous 
school quality variables. In the absence of these variables, if individuals with
7Ordered pruhit or count data models led to qualitatively similar results. OLS results are 




























































































poor past performance select into lower quality schools, school quality indi­
cators tend to be downward biased. Furthermore, past achievements may be 
determined by family characteristics which also effect current performance. The 
results in column 2 show that including past performance indicators changes the 
coefficient on the ptratio variable quite dramatically. The effect on exam perfor­
mance drops by one half, but remains statistically significant. Furthermore, the 
effects of the other family background variables change as well. For instance, 
the effect of father’s and mother’s education drops by about one half. The effect 
of family income decreases, and becomes insignificant. This indicates that both 
school quality and past performance are positively related to family resources 
and parental background.
In column 3, we have conditioned on unemployment rates and the percent­
age of unskilled manual workers on local authority level, as well as on parental 
preferences regarding the offspring’s future academic career. The local labour 
market indicators turn out to be insignificant, while parental interest variables 
have a strong and significant effect on examination performance. For example, 
conditional on parental and family background and the child’s past performance, 
the parents’ wish that the child attends university increases the number of O’ 
levels achieved by 2.7 s Including these variables reduces the size of the ptratio
“Parental preferences are potentially endogenous: variables which are not observed in 
the data, but known to the parents, and affect parents' preferences about the child's career 
as well as the child's exam performance, may lead to an upward bias of the coefficients of 
the preference variables. Some of these factors should be captured by the past performance 




























































































Table 2: Exam Equation. Tobit Models
Specification 1 3 4
Coelf t-ratio Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio
constant -1.762 -1 08 -10.512 -10.31 -9.265 -9.25 -10.62 -9 29
oldsib -0.872 -7.01 -0.548 -4 98 -0.462 -1.41 -0.464 -1.53
yngsib -0.534 -8.45 -0.254 -4.40 -0.173 -3.17 -0.160 -3.00
pawork 1.721 5.45 0.292 1.11 0.236 0 95 0.297 1 22
paprof 0.948 3.20 0.877 3.22 0.618 2.12 0.579 2.31
mawork -0.339 -1.99 -0.325 -2.14 -0.213 -1.18 -0.185 -1.31
female 0.521 3.53 -0.063 -0.48 -0.006 -0.05 -0.025 -0.21
paageft/10 5.602 9.61 2.563 5.89 1.608 3 86 1 111 3 53
maageft/10 4.334 8 98 2.783 5.36 1.625 3.28 1.595 3.27
loginc 0.763 3.35 0.319 1.61 0.022 0.11 -0.013 -0.07
room 0.945 3.69 0.607 2.61 0.455 2.07 0.400 1.86
ptratio -0.307 -8 17 -0.150 -4.23 -0.116 -3,13 -0.090 -0.22
able7/10 0.469 9.62 0.358 7.72 0.304 0.02
ablel 1/10 1.195 24.00 1.017 21 28 0.920 19 11
intpar 0.935 5.87 0.896 5.70
paruniv 2.710 10.50 2.443 15.01
parAlev 1.088 0,19 0.994 0.07
unemp(la) 0.009 0.23 0.001 0.08







"ur 4.102 58.60 3.025 60.51 2.929 58,11 2.78 55.62




























































































Table 2a: PTRATIO. various school types
School type N. Obs. PTRATIO STD
modern 947 18.25 1.69
comp 2021 17.13 1.58
tech 29 10.67 1.76
grammar 558 16.11 1.41
indep 178 14.69 2.80
special 78 13.21 4.17
singsex 1018 16.47 2.22
variable only slightly, and it remains significant.
In column 4 we add school type dummies. The base category refers to 
secondary modern schools (lower ability public schools). The dummies for 
grammar schools, state run schools, and private schools are significant with the 
expected positive sign. Teenagers attending comprehensive (non-selective state 
run), technical, grammar schools (higher ability state run schools) (variables 
GRAMMAR, or independent (selective non-state run schools INDKP) perform sig­
nificantly better, relative to pupils in secondary modern schools.
The order of the effects of school types is reversely related to the pupil 
teacher ratio, as shown in table 2a. The coefficient of the PTRATIO variable de­
creases only slightly, but the standard error increases substantially, which is due 
to the collinearity between this variable and the school type variables. However, 
the effect of school type dummies is considerably larger than what we could ex­
pect as a residt of mere differences in the pupil teacher ratio. For example, the 
average difference in PTRATIO between grammar schools and modern schools of 




























































































to an effect of 0.23, milch less than the coefficient of 1.91 for grammar sc hools 
in column 3. Other factors, such as peer group effects (more intelligent class 
mates in better schools) or quality of teachers are apparently more important 
for exam results than the pupil teacher ratio.
To conclude, our results indicate that school quality, as measured bv the 
number of pupils per full time teacher on school level, has an effect on exam per­
formance. even after controlling for parental background, parental preferences, 
community variables, and the child’s past performance. Omitting parental back­
ground variables and. in particular, past performance indicators, leads to a sulr- 
stantial inflation of the effect of the school quality variable. The effect of the 
pupil teacher ratio becomes insignificant however if we add school type variables 
as an additional set of school quality indicators.
Career Choice
We first discuss probit estimates on the probability that a student decides to 
continue in full time education. We thus collapse training and school leaving 
into one alternative category. In table 3. we present the results.
The specifications we have estimated are the same as in table 2. They are 
reduced form estimations in the sense that we do not condition on exam success. 
We report marginal effects, evaluated at the means (reported in table 1). The 
results in column 1 show that family background variables are important for 
the staying on decision of the teenager. Pupils in larger families are less likely 




























































































siblings. The father's and mothers years of education have the expected positive 
impact on the child's probability to continue full time education. Family income 
is positive and significant. The effect of the variable PTRATIO is quite strong 
and significant. An increase of the variable PTRATIO by one standard deviation 
reduces the probability that the child stays on in full time education by 9 
percentage points.
In column 2, we condition on the test score variables at age 7 and age 11. 
As for exam success, this reduces the effects of family background variables, 
indicating that past performance is related to background variables in the same 
way as the staying on decision. Including these variables mildly reduces the 
effect of the pupil teacher ratio, and it remains strongly significant. In column 
3, we adtl parental preference variables as well as local labour market indica­
tors. This hardly affects the coefficient of the variable PTRATIO. As expected, 
parental interest ami parental preferences have a strong effect on the staying on 
decision. The local labour market indicators are insignificant.
Finally, in column 4 we add the school type variables. This reduces the 
size of the coefficient of PTRATIO, but, other than in the examination equation, 
this coefficient remains negative and significant. Conditional on the type of 
school attended, an increase in the pupil teacher ratio bv one standard deviat ion 
decreases the staying on probability by about 4.3 percent. Accordingly, the 
pupil teacher ratio appears to have a considerable influence on future carper 
choices, even conditional on school type variables.




























































































Table 3: Full Time Education. Probit Models
Specification 1 O 3 4
Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio
\cons -0.229 -2.01 -0.789 -5.74 -0.589 -3.07 -0.675 -1 11
oldsil) -0.080 -5.85 -0.053 -3.57 -0.039 -2.02 -0.040 -2 65
yngsib -0.030 -4 11 -0.023 -2.95 -0.011 -1.38 -0.009 -1.18
pawork 0077 2 10 0.041 1 16 0.036 io n 0.015 1.21
paprof 0.219 5 86 0.161 4.03 0.119 3.05 0.121 3.03
mawork -0.012 -0 66 -0.014 -0 71 -0.003 -0.18 -0.002 -0.12
female 0.004 0.28 -0.027 -1.55 -0.018 -103 -0.021 -1 17
paageft/10 0.625 9 72 0.332 5.62 0.183 308 0.165 2 74
maageft/10 0.430 8 36 0.442 G.15 0.239 3.35 0.233 3.19
logine 0.060 2.44 0.029 1.08 -0.022 -0.82 -0.030 -1.09
room 0.096 3.42 0.095 2.99 0.007 2.12 0.061 1.91
ptratio -0.041 -10.03 -0.032 -6 68 -0.030 -0.23 -0.019 -3 51
ab le7 /1 0 0.045 6.68 0.031 4 GO 0.026 3.87
ablel 1/10 0.073 11 01 0.049 7.31 0.041 5.91
intpar 0.064 2.81 0.059 2.57
paniniv 0.453 18.1G 0.439 17.5G
par A lev 0.232 9.15 0.224 8.72
tmemp(la) 0.001 0.3G o.ooo 0.17



































































































more than the mere difference in the pupil teacher ratios (reported in table 
2a). The ordering of magnitude is similar to that in the examination equation: 
pupils who attend grammar or independent schools have a 16 and 19 percentage 
points higher probability to stay on in full time education than pupils in the 
base category (modern schools). Here, the school type dummies may be captur­
ing a number of effects. For example, peer pressure in grammar or independent 
schools may discourage teenagers from leaving school at the first possible op­
portunity. Furthermore, specialist staff employed to give informed advice about 
education and career choices may have an effect on school leaving decisions.
School, Training or Work
We now turn to models which distinguish between the tw'o alternatives to full 
time education, i.e. training and labour market participation. We have esti­
mated multinomial logit models and generalised ordered probit models in which 
one of the cut off points is allowed to van Hi the exogenous variables (see 
appendix). The latter model has the same flexibility as the multinomial logit 
model and avoids the assumption of independence of irrelevant altermit ices, and 
we therefore report results for this model only. However, multinomial models 
■basically led to the same conclusions.
We report results of the specification which corresponds to specification 1 
in table 3, which includes school type variables. Table 4 displays the estimated 
marginal effects.




























































































Table 4: Career Decisions. Marginal Effects.
Decision: Stay in School Training Labour Market
Variable Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-rat io Coeff t-ratio
oldsih -0.040 2.80 0.001 0.07 0.039 2 77
yngsib -0.010 1.18 -0.007 1.04 0.018 2.33
pawork 0.044 1 10 0.005 0.15 -0.050 1.37
pa|>rof 0.121 2.80 -0.027 0.44 -0.093 1.47
mawork -0.003 0.18 0.033 1 57 -0.029 1 30
female -0.027 1 44 -0.187 9.87 0.215 10.80
paageft/10 0.145 2.40 0.077 1.02 -0.223 2.70
maageft/10 0.229 3.08 -0.086 0.94 -0.143 1.55
logitic -0.020 0.69 0.003 0 12 0.016 0.52
room 0.054 1.08 0.009 0.31 -0.063 2.17
ptratio -0.019 3.09 0.010 2.34 0.009 1.77
able?/10 0.021 3.10 -0.002 0 47 -0.019 3.05
ablell/l() 0.042 5.58 0.008 1.29 -0.051 7.17
intpar 0.065 2.80 0.019 0.98 -0.084 3.89
paruniv 0.443 18.18 -0.084 3.34 -0.359 13 97
paralev 0.231 9.50 -0.010 0.82 -0.215 9.11
nnemp(la) 0.001 0.10 -0.013 2.50 0.012 2.44
nman(la) -0.005 1.37 0.003 0.80 0.002 000
comp 0.066 2.60 -0.015 0 77 -0.051 2.28
tech 0.137 1.77 -0.022 0.22 -0.115 1.04
grammar 0.160 4.74 -0.212 4.42 0.051 1.08
indep 0.185 3.10 -0.021 0.28 -0.164 1.83





























































































to that for the simple prohit model. It increases the probability to enroll in 
training schemes, or to join the labour market, to equal parts, where the latter 
effect is significant only at the 10 percent level. To split up the non education 
category reveals some further interesting details. For instance, while females 
do not differ significantly from males as regards their staying on decision, they 
tend to be much more likely to join the labour market than to enroll in some 
training schemes. In many other cases, the effects respect the expected or­
dering. For example, the test scores at age 11 have a positive impact on the 
probabilities of both states versus regular employment, with the effect on full 
time education much larger than that on training. Similar results hold for the 
family background variables and for parental preferences.
File models presented in tables 3 and 1 are reduced form specifications in 
the sense that they do not include examination performance as a regressor. We 
have estimated a number of structural models where we condition additionally 
on exam performance. The structural estimation results are insightful to access 
the robustness of our findings, and to investigate whether structural est imation 
changes the effect of the other parameter estimates. We estimate examination- 
and continuation equations simultaneously by maximum likelihood (see appen­
dix for details). Although we condition explicitly on previous ability test scores, 
therefore controlling for usually unobservable ability components, some unol>- 
served heterogeneity may be left which affects both examination performance 
and career decisions. To account for potential endogeneity bias of examination 
performance in the career choice equation, we allow for correlation between the 




























































































To identify tiiis model without relying on the normality assumption of 
tlie error terms requires exogenous instruments that do not affect the career 
choice directly. We have experimented with two different identification strate­
gies First, we have included a set of 118 county dummies in the examination 
equation, hut we have excluded these variables from the career choice equation 
School expenditures in the UK are decided on county level, and county dum­
mies should capture level effects of school quality. This is valid if variations in 
school expenditures, tis reflected by the county dummies, affect career choices 
only indirectly via examination success, conditional on background variables 
and previous achievements.
Second, we use indicators of school absenteeism for reasons of illness in 
the year before the final examinations. Here our assumption for the validity 
of our instruments is that absenteeism affects career choices only indirectly via 
examination success. This seems reasonable as long as past health hazards are 
of an unforeseen and temporary nature for instance, absenteeism because of 
flu. or a minor accident, may affect examination performance, but. conditional 
on exam scores, should not have a direct effect on career choice. However, if 
health problems which have affected school attendance, are more permanent, 
they may also affect career choices in a direct manner, even after conditioning on 
past examination performance. In this case, our instruments would be invalid
Finally, we also estimate models which rely on normality for identification
only.




























































































Table 5: Career Decisions, Effects of PTRATIO
Decision: Stay in School Training Labour Market
Variable Coeff t-ra tio Coeff t-ra tio Coelf t-ratio
Identification: Normality; No School Types
Total Effect -0.0273 5.20 0.0149 .J 112 0.0124 2.01
Direct Effect -0.0235 4 72 0.0132 3.066 0.0102 2.16
Indirect Effect -0.0038 2.33 0.0016 1 935 0.0022 1.52
D>g-Likelihood: -7175.88; p = -0.138: t-value =  1.95
Identification Absenteeism; No School Types
Total Effect -0.0276 5 12 0.0147 3 23 0.0129 2.56
Direct Effect -0.0225 1.50 0.0133 2.91 0.0092 1.81
Indirect Effect -0.0051 2.60 0.0014 1.80 0.0037 2.01
Log-Likelihood: -7159 98 p = -0.056; t-valui 0.85
Identification: C ounty Dummies; No School Types
Total Effect 0.0327 5.82 0.0173 4.00 0.0154 3.05
Direct Effect -0.0206 1 97 0.0151 3.57 0.0115 2.30
Indirect Effect -0.0061 2.72 0.0022 2.08 0.0038 1.89
Log-Likelihood: -7121.84: p = -0.107: l-valm 1.73
Identification: Absenteeism; Schoc 1 Types in luded
Total Effect -0.0175 2.85 0.0103 2.12 0.0072 1.38
Direct Effect -0.0173 3.00 0.0102 2 13 0.0070 1.10
Indirect Effect -0.0002 0.12 0.0001 0 11 0.0002 0 12




























































































and similar to those in table 1. Table A1 presents the model in table 1 inc lud­
ing exam performance, where absenteeism is used as instruments. Comparing 
the reduced form and the structural specifications shows that conditioning on 
exam success reduces most other coefficients in magnitude, but does not change 
anf' of the qualitative conclusions. The effect of examination performance on 
the staying on decision is, as expected, positive, but quite moderate in size. 
The effect of the pupil teacher ratio on the probability to stay on at school is 
significantly negative.
Table 5 summarises the main results for the various specifications. The 
first model is nested in the other three. Likelihood ratio tests show that the 
absenteeism variables are jointly significant in the exam success equation, while 
the county dummies are not. The correlation between the unobservables is 
negative, but exogeneity of examination performance is not rejected in all cases. 
We have decomposer! the total effect of t fie pupil teacher ratio on the three 
decisions (corresponding to the effect in the reduced form equation) into a direct 
effect and an indirect effect via examination performance. Point estimates of 
the marginal effects and t-statisties are also presented in table 5 (see appendix 
for calculation), for the various specifications.
The first three panels display results when school type variables are ex­
cluded, for the three specifications. The first row reports the total effect; in 
the next two rows, the total effect is broken dowm into its direct and indirect 
components. The effect of the pupil teacher ratio is quite similar in the three 




























































































ratio by one standard error decreases the probability that the child stays on at 
school bv 6 to 7 percentage points. The indirect effect is significantly different 
from zero, but it contributes only to one fourth of the total effect.
The last panel reports results when school type variables are included, 
where absenteeism is used for identification. The indirect effect now drops to 
zero, as expected from the results in table 2. and the direct effect is reduced 
in size. Its significantly negative effect on the choice for full time education 
remains.
5 C onclusion
We investigate the effect of school quality measures on exam success and career 
choices of 16 year old school children. Accordingly, we examine the effects 
of school input on performance and career decisions at a particularly early 
stage of the students' career. We find that, conditional on parental background 
information and the teenager’s past performance, the pupil teacher ratio has a 
significant and negative effect on examination performance. The British si hool 
system distinguishes between various school types, among them selective and 
non-seleetive schools. If we condition on school type variables, this effect of the 
pupil teacher ratio becomes insignificant.
As for career choices, we focus on the decision at age 16. For an analysis 
of the impact of the quality of secondary schools, this seems a more direct 




























































































that the impact of rising pupil teacher ratios is perhaps much more important 
than previously thought. We find that teenagers in schools with high pupil 
teacher ratios have a larger probability to drop out of school at age 1C. This 
effect prevails even when controlling for school types and when conditioning on 
previous exam performance. It is also robust for the type of model that is used. 
Thus, an increase in pupil teacher ratios is likely to affect far more than just 
educational performance, if the more long term issues are considered. These 
results are in line with earlier findings by Card and Krueger (1992). who use 
state level data for the U S. and find that a decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio 
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Appendix: Likelihood Contributions, Marginal Effects, 
and Structural Model
We model the number of O’ level passes obtained at age 10 as a censored regression equation:
E* = Ae,^ e + »E i; E, = m ax (£ ,\0 ). (2)
Here £  denotes the number of O’ levels achieved. £* is a latent variable. Af. is a vector 
of explanatory variables, and ue is an error term.
The choice between continuing full-time education (CIO =  2). going into a training 
programme (CIO = 1 ) . and entering the labour force (ClG =  0) is modeled as an ordered
response:
C* = AaÛc + 7c  E, + mc«- (3)
c, = o if c; < o. c, = i ifo < c; < mCl, c, = 2 if c; > »»r .
Here C* is a latent variable. Ac, is a vector of explanatory variables, and tic is an error 
term. In a structural specification, the index C* depends on exam success, with coefficient 
•yc• I» the standard ordered probit model, the category bound me > 0 is estimated as an 
additional parameter. We allow me to depend on all explanatory variables in the equation:
mc i = erp(Aei d,n + 7m E, ). (1)
This leads to a model with the same degree of flexibility as the multinomial logit model, 
in which the alternatives are not ordered (cf. Pradhau and Van Soest (11)95) for a comparison 
of the two in a similar framework).
The error terms Uf- and tic are assumed to be independent from all explanatory vari­
ables and bivariate normally distributed. By means of normalisation, we set Var(tic) = 
rr% . = 1 The correlation between the two cn.n^. Cnrr(tie , t//.;). is given by j> For the 
structural model, we include exam outcomes as additional regressors in (if) and (1).
Likelihood C ontribution
We only present the likelihood contributions of individuals with CIO = 1 (training scheme). 
Likelihood contributions of those with CIO = 0 or CIO = 2 are derived in a similar manlier. 
We distinguish two cases:
1). £  =  (); C =  1.




























































































L P\Em < 0. (I < C" < m, |
P[ ii t < -  X, .<£ ■ ~ A'c J ( • < ne < me -  AV t
( 5)
For m e . the expression in (1} can l>e snlistitntfsl.
2): £ =£• >( ) :  C = 1
Denote the residual in the exam equation hv 1 1  -  F -  A , • Then the likelihood 
contribution is given by
^  = /£ . ( £ )  P { 0 <  C* < mc |£} =
=  fu, (ft:) P { - X c  J r  -  be E < up < mc  -  A'c Jr  ~ be E\ iif. =  « >.}
Here ft;- and / u/ are the univariate normal densities of Em (conditional on exogenous vari­
ables) and iif.
We use the BFGS algorithm in CJAl'SS to maximize the likelihood, and computed the 
standard  errors from the outer products of the scores.
M arginal Effects in School Leaving Equation
The computation of the marginal effects presented in Tables -1 is based on (3) and (1). For 
notational convenience, we write Zc = (Ac-E). 0c = (Jc'bcY* and 0„, = We
then have
- / u, ( - Z c 0r )0c. (7)
/u< (—Z ( '0 c )V c  + ~  Z c ^ c )  ("*c -  ^ r |. (8)
fu, (mr  ~ Z('ffr) |Or ~ » " r  | (9 )
Since the marginal effects are functions of the parameters, the standard errors of their 
estimates can be computed from the standard errors of Hie parameter estimates (taking 
the distribution of Z(- as given). This can in principle be done by the delta method. A 
computationally easier alternative is to use simulations. The standard errors in the tables are 
computed as the standard deviations in samples of 1300 marginal effects, computed from 500 
draws of the vector of parameters from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the vector 
of parameter estimates.
The total and indirect effects in the structural form equations and their standard errors 
(Table G) are computed in a similar manner. We simply substitute the terms with the inner 
derivatives in (7) (9) by the appropriate expressions, corresponding to tin* total and indirect
effects.
0 P \ C  = 0|Zr| 
OZc
o r\c  = \\Zr\ 
OZc





























































































Table A l: Career Decisions. Marginal Effects.
Decision: Stay in School Training Labour Market
Variable Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio
oldsib -0.030 1.89 -0.003 0.22 0.033 2.20
yngsib -0.004 0.45 -0.010 1.25 0.014 1.83
pawork 0.029 0.70 0.010 0.29 -0.039 l.U(>
paprof 0.094 2.18 -0.020 0.11 -0.007 1.08
mawork 0.004 0.18 0.031 1.50 -0.030 1 03
female -0.027 1.43 -0.187 9.70 0.21 1 10.85
paageft/10 0.102 1.71 0.071 0 97 -0.173 2.15
maageft/10 0.199 2 59 -0.101 1.14 -0.098 1.01
logine -0.004 0.13 -0.003 0.13 0.007 0.27
room -0.044 1.36 -0.015 0.58 0.000 2.10
ptratio -0.017 3.00 0.010 2.13 0.007 1.10
able7/10 0.010 2.21 -0.003 0.04 -0.012 2.07
ablell/10 0.011 1.16 0.017 2.CO -0.028 3.09
intpar 0.040 1.60 0.029 1,18 -0.009 2.99
paruniv 0.390 13.34 -0.084 3.09 -0.300 9,10
paralev 0.228 8.91 -0.020 0.88 -0.207 8.10
unemp(la 0.001 0.10 -0.014 2.42 0.013 2.33
mn(la) -0.005 1.32 0.003 0.79 0.002 0 03
comp 0.052 2.05 -0.021 1 IH) -0.031 1.54
tedi 0.122 1.50 -0.000 0.00 -0.110 110
grammar 0.082 2.13 -0.205 1.35 0.123 2.31
indep 0.131 2.10 -0.003 0.01 -0.127 1.42
singsex 0.021 0.92 0.008 0.31 -0.029 1.20
exam 0.054 5.35 -0.008 1 30 -0.040 3.57



























































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (F I)- Italy 





□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1998/99





































































































W orking Papers of the Department of Economics 
Published since 1997
ECO No. 97/1 
Jonathan SIMON
The Expected Value of Lotto when not all 
Numbers are Equal
ECO No. 97/2 
Bernhard WINKLER 
Of Sticks and Carrots: Incentives and the 
Maastricht Road to EMU
ECO No. 97/3 
James DOW/Rohit RAH1 




Signalling Aspects of Managers'
Incentives
ECO No. 97/5
Humberto LOPEZ/Eva ORTEGA/Angel 
UBIDE
Dating and Forecasting the Spanish 
Business Cycle
ECO No. 97/6 
Yadira GONZALEZ de LARA 
Changes in Information and Optimal Debt 
Contracts: The Sea Loan
ECO No. 97/7 
Sandrine LABORY
Organisational Dimensions of Innovation
ECO No. 97/8 
Sandrine LABORY
Firm Structure and Market Structure: A 
Case Study of the Car Industry
ECO No. 97/9
Elena BARDASl/Chiara MONFARD1NI 
The Choice of the Working Sector in 
Italy: A Trivariatc Probit Analysis
ECO No. 97/10
Bernhard WINKLER








Can Waste Improve Welfare?
ECO No. 97/13
Christian DUSTMANN/Arthur van 
SOEST




Mathematical and Statistical Modelling of 
Cointegration
ECO No. 97/15
Tom ENGSTED/Sprcn JOHANSEN 





Likelihood Analysis of Seasonal 
Cointegration
ECO No. 97/17
Maozu LU/Grayham E. MIZON 
Mutual Encompassing and Model 
Equivalence
ECO No. 97/18 
Dimitries S1DERIS
Multilateral Versus Bilateral Testing for 
Long Run Purchasing Power Parity: A 
Cointegration Analysis for the Greek 
Drachma
ECO No. 97/19 
Bruno VERSAEVEL 




An Application of Cox’s Non-Nesled 
Test to Trinomial Logit and Probit 
Models
ECO No. 97/21 
James DOW/Rohit RAIII 






























































































Are Intergovernmental Transfers in 
Russia Equalizing?
ECO No. 97/23 
Paolo VITALE
Speculative Noise Trading and 
Manipulation in the Foreign Exchange 
Market
ECO No. 97/24 
GUnther REHME
Economie Growth, (Re-)Distribulive 
Policies, Capital Mobility and Tax 
Competition in Open Economies
ECO No. 97/25 
Susana GARCIA CERVERO 
A Historical Approach to American Skill 
Differentials
ECO No. 97/26 
Susana GARCIA CERVERO 
Growth, Technology and Inequality: An 
Industrial Approach
ECO No. 97/27 
Bauke VISSER
Organizational Structure and Performance
ECO No. 97/28 
Pompeo DELLA POSTA 
Central Bank Independence and Public 
Debt Convergence in an Open Economy 
Dynamic Game
ECO No. 97/29 
Matthias BRUECKNER 
Voting and Decisions in the ECB
ECO No. 97/30
Massimiliano MARCELLINO 
Temporal Disaggregation, Missing 
Observations. Outliers, and Forecasting: 
A Unifying Non-Model Based Procedure
ECO No. 97/31
Marion KOHLER
Bloc Formation in International Monetary 
Policy Coordination
ECO No. 97/32 
Marion KOHLER




The Comparative Static Effects of Many
Changes
ECO No. 97/34 
Lavan MAHADEVA 
Endogenous Growth with a Declining 
Rate of Interest
ECO No. 97/35 
Spyros VASS1LAKIS 
Managing Design Complexity to Improve 





ECO No. 98/1 
Bauke VISSER
Binary Decision Structures and the 
Required Detail of Information
ECO No. 98/2
Michael ARTIS/Massim i I iano
MARCELLINO
Fiscal Solvency and Fiscal Forecasting in 
Europe
ECO No. 98/3
Giampiero M. GALLO/Barbara PACINI 
Early News is Good News: The Effects 
of Market Opening on Market Volatility
ECO No. 98/4
Michael J. ARTIS/Zcnon G. 
KONTOLEM1S
Inflation Targeting and the European 
Central Bank
ECO No. 98/5 
Alexandre KOLEV
The Distribution of Enterprise Benefits in 
Russia and their impact on Individuals' 
Well-Being
ECO No. 98/6 
Kilty STEWART
Financing Education at the Local Level: A 





























































































ECO No. 98/7 
Anna PETTINI/Louis PHLIPS 





More Equal but Less Mobile? Education
Financing and Intergenerational Mobility
in Italy and in the US
ECO No. 98/9 
Andrea ICHINO/Pielro 1CHINO 
Discrimination or Individual Effort? 





The Long-Run Educational Cost of 
World War II. An Example of Local 
Average Treatment Effect Estimation
ECO No. 98/11 
Luca FLABBI/Andrea ICHINO 
Productivity. Seniority and Wages. New 
Evidence from Personnel Data
ECO No. 98/12
Jian-Ming ZHOU
Is Nominal Public but De Facto Private 
Land Ownership Appropriate? A 
Comparative Study among Cambodia, 
Laos, Vietnam; Japan, Taiwan Province 
of China, South Korea; China. Myanmar; 
and North Korea
ECO No. 98/13 
Anna PETTIN1
Consumers’ Tastes and the Optimal Price 
Gap
ECO No. 98/14 
Christian DUSTMANN/Najma 
RAJAH/Arthur VAN SOEST 
School Quality. Exam Performance, and 
Career Choice
out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
■'*ÛA
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
